Japan

by David Murray

It has always been felt that the exaction of this large indemnity was a harsh if not an unwarrantable proceeding. The government of Yedo had disavowed and apologized for the conduct of the rebellious daimyō, and promised, if time were allowed, to reduce him to subjection. Of the powers which were allied in the expedition, Great Britain had suffered no damage, and the United States had already received an indemnity for the injuries and expenses of the vessel fired upon. To insist, therefore, upon the government not only paying for the damage inflicted, but for the expense of an unnecessarily large and costly expedition to suppress the rebellious subordinate, which was sent contrary to the express protest of the responsible government, seems too much like that overbearing diplomacy with which western nations have conducted their intercourse in the East.[295] The promised sum, however, [pg 350] was at last, after much financial distress, all paid, and the painful episode was ended.

One undesigned benefit resulted from the Shimonoseki expedition. Just as the bombardment of Kagoshima had taught the daimyō of Satsuma the folly of resisting western armaments, so now the daimyō of Chōshū had learned by an expensive experience the same bitter lesson. For the future these two powerful clans might therefore be counted on, not only to oppose the moribund government of Yedo, but to withstand the folly of trying to expel the foreigners who by treaty with an unauthorized agent had been admitted into the country. The Chōshū leaders had also taken advantage of their experiences in this conflict with foreigners to put their troops on a better basis as regards arms and organization. For the first time the privilege of the samurai to do all the fighting, was disregarded, and a division[296] of troops was formed from the common people, which was armed with foreign muskets and drilled in the western tactics. They went by the name of “irregular troops” (kiheitai), and played no small part in rendering nugatory the efforts of the shōgun to “chastise” the daimyō of Chōshū in 1865 and 1866.

Another noteworthy military event deserves mention here. Colonel Neale had applied to his government for a military guard to protect British interests [pg 351] at Yokohama. Two companies of the 20th regiment were sent from Hongkong, and with the consent of the Japanese government took up their residence in 1864 at barracks in the foreign settlement. They were afterwards joined by a French contingent, and for many years they were a familiar sight, and gave a sense of security to the nervous residents.

While these serious collisions were taking place between Japan and the foreign powers, there was an increasing and irreconcilable animosity developed between the Kyōto and Yedo governments. The ostensible reason, which was put forward on all occasions, was the difference of opinion upon the question of the foreign treaties and foreign intercourse. The Yedo government had by the force of circumstances become practically familiar with the views of the representatives of foreign nations, and had been convinced that the task of expelling foreigners and returning again to the ancient policy of seclusion was far beyond the power of Japan. On the contrary, the court of the emperor was a hot-bed of anti-foreign sentiment in which all the ancient prejudices of the empire naturally flourished, and where the feudal princes who were jealous of the shōgun found a ready element in which to foment difficulties.

Two important games were in progress. Yedo was the field on which one of these was to be decided, and the players were the representatives of the treaty powers on the one side, and the shōgun's government on the other. Victory had already been [pg 352] virtually declared in favor of an open country and foreign intercourse. The other game was being played at Kyōto between the shōgun's friends and his enemies. The stake was a momentous one, namely, to determine whether the present dual government was to continue and who was hereafter to wield the destinies of the empire.

The government of the shōgun had long been convinced that it was necessary to make the best of the presence of foreigners in the country and that it was vain to make further exertions for their expulsion. But a vast number of the feudal retainers of the daimyōs were still bitterly hostile, and took frequent occasion to commit outrages, for which the government was held responsible. Besides the cases which have been already mentioned, a new legation which the British government had built in Gotenyama, a site which the Japanese government had set apart in Yedo for foreign legations, was burned to the ground in 1863. In the same year the temple buildings in Yedo which the United States had leased for a legation were burned. Twice the shōgun's castle in Yedo had been destroyed by fire. A murderous attack was made upon British subjects in Nagasaki; Lieutenant de Cannes of the French troops was assassinated in 1864; and in the same year Major Baldwin and Lieutenant Bird, two British officers, were murdered at Kamakura.

These repeated outrages seriously disturbed the Yedo government, and led to several attempts to curtail the privileges which by the treaties were [pg 353] secured to foreigners. The last proposition of the kind which was made was one conveyed to the French government by an embassy sent out in 1864. They presented a request to have the port of Kanagawa closed up and trade to be confined to Hakodate and Nagasaki. They received no encouragement, however, and returned with their eyes “opened by the high state of material and moral prosperity which surrounded them,” and reported the complete failure of their attempts at persuasion. “The bakufu reprimanded them for having disgraced their functions, and, reducing their incomes, forced them to retire into private life.”[297]

It is necessary now to trace the course of events at Kyōto. According to the theory of the government of Japan the emperor was the supreme and unlimited ruler and the shōgun was his executive. The maintenance of the emperor and his court was a function of the shōgun, and hence it was almost always possible for him to compel the emperor to pursue any policy which he might desire.

At the time now under review Kōmei, the father of the present emperor, occupied the imperial throne. He had succeeded to this dignity in 1847 at the age of eighteen, and he died in 1866 at the age of thirty-seven. The shōgun was Iemochi, who in 1858 had been chosen from the family of Kii, because of the failure of an heir in the regular line. At the time of his election he was a boy of twelve years of age, and was placed under the guardianship of the prime minister Ii Kamon-no-kami. After the assassination [pg 354] of the prime minister in 1861, Hitotsubashi Gyōbukyō, a son of the daimyō of Mito, was appointed guardian, and served in this capacity until the shōgun's death.

Around the court of the emperor were gathered many discordant elements. The party of the shōgun was always represented, and the daimyō of Aizu, its ardent friend and champion, had the honorable distinction of guarding the imperial palace. By invitation many other daimyōs were at Kyōto with retinues of officers and attendants, and with guards of troops. The southern and western daimyōs were present in imposing numbers, and although they did not always agree among themselves, they were in harmony in the general purpose to discredit the government at Yedo and to promote the imperial authority.