‘We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany.
‘This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed territories for colonization.’
These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin Tägliche Rundschau thus exposed Germany’s future attitude toward Russia:—
‘If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory which we so sorely need for colonization.’
The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity, written so recently, and Tannenberg’s outline, published six years ago, is indeed striking.
Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg’s plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hypothesis.
In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia should continue to submit to anarchy fostered by German agents, her financial situation, already perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the interest on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan-Germany, now momentarily established, continues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over Russian obligations to France without the necessity of a formal treaty. In fact, the tremendous pressure against Russia, exerted by the mere geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies athwart Europe, would practically render unnecessary the formal cession of French credit. Berlin, taking fullest advantage of the situation, would then say to Petrograd, ‘We consider that France owes us a considerable sum by way of war-indemnity. We are unable to collect this, but you Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore assume the position of France as your creditor, and, as the strength of Pan-Germany has put you practically at our mercy, we demand the payment of your debts in such and such a form.’
What resistance could disorganized Russia make to this claim, presented with true German cynicism?
Russian extremists need not hope, as certain of them do, to avoid paying the debts contracted by the old régime. If they do not care to fulfill their obligations to France, which is working hard to sustain the Russian Revolution, they will have to pay those same debts to Berlin, where full use would be made of them to exploit the Russian people.
Moreover, the ‘purchase’ of French- and English-owned railroads in Turkey, suggested several months ago by Berlin, of which we have already spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans intend also to follow out the system of transferring credits in cases where money is owed by Germany’s allies to Germany’s enemies. For a long period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased the state obligations of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is impossible to give the exact amount of French money thus invested in Pan-Germanized Central and Eastern Europe, for the securities of the above-mentioned countries were generally floated in several foreign financial centres at once; but persons who have the most thorough knowledge of French investments make a minimum estimate of six billion francs. As for the French money invested in Roumania and Serbia it will vanish into thin air as soon as the Austro-German conquests are consolidated. As for investments in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption by Germany of French credits—supposing peace to be concluded on the basis of the present war-map—would be easily accomplished if she reasoned as follows with her allies:—